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14.1  Introduction
Corporate ethical scandals, the financial and economic crisis of the past several 
years, and examples of misuse of power by prominent leaders have shocked the 
business world. They have not only called into question the role of the economic 
system design at large, but have also raised questions about the role of leaders in 
influencing ethics and ethical behavior in organizations. It is hardly controversial to 
state that aspects of management and leadership are crucial in determining the stra-
tegical direction and daily operations of an organization. Few would doubt that 
leaders are key figures in shaping ethical conduct. However, little is known about 
what constitutes ethical leadership. What are the relevant competencies leaders 
should acquire? The behavior of leaders and the extent to which they behave with 
moral integrity has also become a topic of high interest in the media and public 
discussion. Yet, many people believe that ethical leadership is simply a matter of 
having good character or having the “right values. “Although character and values 
are obviously important, the concept of ethical leadership is far more complex than 
those factors and there is little consensus on what precisely characterizes ethical 
leadership.
The field of ethical leadership can be divided roughly into two realms of inquiry. 
Psychology (and economics) is concerned with descriptive (or empirical) ethics as 
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to how individuals “do” behave, while ethics is concerned with the normative impli-
cations of leadership and the question as to how individuals and organizations 
“should” behave. We argue that both empirical and normative approaches are 
important in the research and discussion of ethical leadership. Hence, this chapter 
explores the possibilities for cross-fertilization between psychology and ethics.
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. Our first goal is to highlight some typi-
cal features of the empirical and normative approaches to exploring ethical decision- 
making and behavior, and to sketch out how ethics and psychology can learn and 
benefit from each other. We argue that empirical research without normative reflec-
tion is “blind”. Since empirical leadership research usually has normative implica-
tions, normative reflection is necessary to identify and understand those implications. 
On the other hand, normative reflection is “empty” without empirical insights. We 
believe that studying ethical leadership using an interdisciplinary approach helps to 
advance our knowledge of what constitutes or should constitute ethical leadership 
and how it can be promoted. Second, based on previous empirical research and our 
own perspectives, we wish to shed light on some important components and compe-
tencies of ethical leaders. Even though most scholars agree that all forms of leader-
ship should be based on some ethical foundations (Bass and Steidlmeier 1999; 
Kanungo 2001), discussions still differ in regard to what should be expected from 
an ethical leader. While discussing important characteristics of ethical leaders, we 
also aim to discover some unresolved key questions about ethical leadership. We 
argue that these questions reflect important points of intersection between empirical 
and normative approaches, and points where it appears beneficial that normative 
reflection comes in. These questions and their implications for the practice of moral 
behavior and leadership will be discussed in the final section.
14.2  The Relation Between Empirical and Normative 
Research
Both ethicists and psychologists are concerned with identifying the qualities of 
moral behavior, yet they pursue distinctive goals. Ethicists usually evaluate and jus-
tify the quality of actions through reflective deliberations (Singer 2000) referring to 
abstract standards of ethical conduct and a moral point of view. Their focus is on 
normative goals and the question of what ought to be done. In contrast, psycholo-
gists examine people’s beliefs, values and actual behaviors in specific contexts, and 
test assumptions about the mechanisms involved in ethical decision-making and 
behavior through empirical research. Their focus is on descriptive goals which aim 
to discover what actually is. Despite these differences, calls for a dialog and a closer 
relation between the empirical and normative approaches in moral research and 
business ethics are often heard (e.g., Singer 2000; Weaver and Treviño 1994; 
Waterman 1988). Our goal in this portion of the chapter is to contribute to this 
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empirical-normative dialog in the context of ethics and ethical leadership by 
 emphasizing how the two can be mutually beneficial.
One problem of empirical research in the realm of ethics is that its concepts of 
moral values, norms or behavior typically rest upon consensual beliefs and common 
views of morality. This is also the case in leadership research. As such, the research 
concepts represent “social constructions that reflect the value and paradigms of 
leadership at a particular time and place” (Ciulla 2006: 21). Though empirical stud-
ies often build upon prior interviews with experts and practitioners, the concepts 
implemented in experiments and surveys are based on characteristics people con-
sider to be ethical in leaders. However, generating knowledge about what people 
claim to be moral does not tell us if these claims are normatively appropriate. In 
other words, providing descriptions about what is, does not automatically reveal 
what should be (Waterman 1988; Fraedrich et al. 2011: 240). When, for example, 
Kohlberg claims that the highest stage of moral thinking is expressed in terms of a 
deontological moral perspective, this description shifts into prescription (cf., Miner 
and Petocz 2003: 15). In philosophy this slide is considered problematic and is 
called the “naturalistic fallacy” (Dunfee and Donaldson 2002: 41). Interdisciplinary 
collaboration is therefore important to psychology since it helps to take into account 
the normative implications of the concepts used, and to reduce the risk of merely 
deeming common sense to be sufficient for deciding which standards and behaviors 
are ethically adequate. Moreover, as Miner and Petocz (2003) argue, any psycho-
logical investigation must acknowledge the importance of meta-ethical positions 
and specific moral theories for ethical decision-making and then “consider how they 
might affect the processes and outcomes of decision-making” (p. 14).
On the other hand, in examining which processes and factors determine moral 
judgment and behavior, psychology has provided solid insights about human func-
tioning which should also be essential for understanding normative ethics. For 
instance, one insight, for which there is converging empirical evidence, is that moral 
judgment and decision-making are often based on automatic intuitive reactions 
rather than reflective deliberations (Haidt 2001). Studies have shown that externally 
induced or even hypnotically induced gut feelings (such as flashes of disgust) do 
causally affect moral judgments, supporting the view that such gut feelings or moral 
intuitions serve as information when evaluating moral transgressions (e.g., Wheatley 
and Haidt 2005). There is, in addition, much evidence that the nature of automatic- 
intuitive or more deliberative-reflective processing is highly contingent on personal 
and situational factors (e.g., Fazio 1990). Overall, empirical research has made a 
valuable contribution to normative ethics and encouraged further discussions by 
forcing acknowledgement of the role of moral intuitions and automatic processes in 
ethical decision-making (Kennett and Fine 2009; Treviño 2009).
Should normative ethics account for these empirical findings about what deter-
mines moral judgment and decision-making? In the context of business ethics, 
empirical sciences provide information about actual problems and conflicts with 
which business agents contend. They generate knowledge about individual differ-
ences in judgment, behavior, values and attitudes based upon the people who make 
decisions. This is important for ethics for two reasons. First, without this empirical 
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“material” normative ethics would lack a sound basis for its reflection. Hence, it is 
an important task for ethics to clarify and formulate systematically what people 
think (Miller 2008: 93f.). Second, normative approaches without certain knowledge 
of people’s specific beliefs and values, which serve to guide their judgments and 
behaviors, risk being irrelevant to any attempted application or implementation in 
daily life and professional settings. In either case, normative ethics proceeds in a 
critical way, asking whether or not people’s given moral judgments and decision- 
making are right from a moral point of view. This form of critical analysis may, of 
course, end in doubts about the legitimacy of empirically ascertained moral judg-
ments and decisions.
In sum, we believe that fostering a empirical-normative dialog is beneficial for 
advancing moral theory and research. Empirical research is blind without normative 
reflection since its concepts fail the critical analysis of whether they are normatively 
appropriate, meaning whether the norms and values people use to guide their judg-
ments and actions are indeed right. In turn, normative reflection is empty without 
empirical knowledge and risks being of little practical value without acknowledging 
the relevance of what is, and why it is. To generate an empirical-normative dialog, 
the purpose of the next section is to identify some intersections within ethical lead-
ership research where the bringing together of “is” and “ought” issues may be cru-
cial and useful. To this end, we start with a short overview of the empirical literature 
on ethical leadership and then define some core features of ethical leaders. In so 
doing, our goal is to identify those (or at least some) key areas of ethical decision- 
making and ethical leadership research where it may be important to employ norma-
tive reflection.
14.3  What Are the Characteristics of Ethical Leadership?
14.3.1  Empirical Research on Ethical Leadership
Understanding the constituents of ethical leadership has captured the interest of 
researchers and practitioners alike. In particular, one large empirical research line 
has looked to develop frameworks explaining the process of ethical decision- making 
(for a comprehensive overview, see Treviño et al. 2006). While this research has 
made important contributions to understanding and predicting ethical decision- 
making by describing how individuals actually think and act when faced with ethi-
cal situations, it says little about what the essential characteristics of ethical leaders 
are. In this regard, leadership research and, more recently, research into moral intel-
ligence (see also the Chap. 7 of Tanner and Christen, in this volume) seek to identify 
and develop moral competences of ethical leadership and conduct.
As to leadership research, various approaches have emerged over the past 
decades. Although all of them tap into ethical aspects in some way, such dimensions 
actually play a relatively implicit or indirect role. For instance, embedded in the 
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charismatic or transformational leadership paradigm is the idea that “transforming” 
leaders are those who feel responsible for achieving the good for their organization 
and society, and who inspire followers to elevate their levels of motivation and 
morality (Bass and Steidlmeier 1999). Conceptualizations of authentic leadership 
typically assert that (moral) authenticity is achieved when individuals act in concert 
with an internalized moral perspective (e.g., Gardner et al. 2005). Still other models 
have highlighted either the importance of a leader’s ethical values that guide choices 
and behaviors (e.g., Resick et al. 2006; Russell 2001), or the role of a leader’s moral 
virtues (e.g. Manz et al. 2008; Solomon 2003).
With an explicit focus on ethical leadership, seminal work has been performed 
by Brown and colleagues (Brown et al. 2005; Brown and Treviño 2006). They 
define ethical leadership as “the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct 
through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such 
conduct to followers through two-way communication and decision-making” 
(Brown et al. 2005: 120). As to this conceptualization, ethical leadership involves 
promoting normatively appropriate conduct through role modeling and interper-
sonal relationships. The authors also suggest some ethical ideals that they deem to 
be (normatively) right: ethical leaders should be perceived as trustworthy, fair and 
concerned about others; they should set clear ethical standards and use rewards and 
punishments to promote ethical conduct. Consistent with these suggestions, Brown 
and colleagues have built an Ethical Leadership Scale (ELS) designed to assess 
whether a leader can be characterized as fair, trustworthy, or caring, and whether he 
or she makes an effort to communicate or demonstrate ethical behaviors (Brown 
et al. 2005).
In a similar vein, one author of this chapter and her colleagues have taken an 
action-based approach, developing an Ethical Leadership Behavior Scale (ELBS) 
(Tanner et al. 2010) that is based on specific behaviors reflecting concrete manifes-
tations of ethical values (such as fairness, respect) across occasions and situational 
challenges. This approach shares with others the idea that moral norms and values 
are essential in guiding and promoting ethical conduct, but remains distinct from 
them by calling for more focused attention on whether and how moral values are 
reflected in behavioral patterns. It is commonly known that values and good inten-
tions are not always implemented in actions. Of course, there may be many good 
reasons why leaders with moral intentions may choose not to act ethically, including 
that of avoiding unpopularity or preserving their own career (May et al. 2003). 
Tanner and colleagues (2010) and other scholars (Ciulla 1999) therefore emphasize 
the importance of leaders acting upon moral standards and values consistently, on a 
regular basis, and despite potentially unpleasant consequences, in order to earn the 
attribute of an “ethical leader.”
With the concept of moral intelligence, a quite different approach to moral or 
ethical leadership has recently emerged. In the past, researcher and practitioners 
alike acknowledged that beyond cognitive skills, emotional intelligence and social 
intelligence represent additional advantageous capabilities (e.g., Goleman 1995; 
Salovey and Mayer 1990). In the aftermath of recent business scandals, researchers 
and practitioners alike have now started to turn their attention more thoroughly to 
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the moral competencies that business leaders should have or acquire. With an 
explicit emphasis on moral skills, Lennick and Kiel (2005) introduced the term 
moral intelligence to capture a new facet of intelligence. Tanner and Christen (Chap. 
7 in this volume) define moral intelligence as the individual’s capacity to process 
and manage moral problems. Current research and discussion is engaged in identi-
fying and assessing the key elements and abilities of moral intelligence (Lennick 
and Kiel 2005; Martin and Austin 2010; Narvaez 2005; Chap. 7 by Tanner and 
Christen, in this volume). Scholars working in this area or the domain of moral 
expertise commonly assert that individuals need multiple abilities, but their 
approaches differ in terms of which skills and subskills are crucial. An elaborated 
model by Narvaez (2005), for instance, posits that moral experts need skills in ethi-
cal sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation and moral action. In general, we 
believe that the approach of moral intelligence with its emphasis on various moral 
skills can expand our understanding of ethical leadership in useful ways.
In the following section, we wish to highlight a few core characteristics of ethical 
leadership, building upon the research and development of leadership and morality. Our 
goal is also to discover points of intersection between empirical and normative 
approaches by identifying some key questions about ethical leadership that demand nor-
mative reflection. In this chapter we will focus on just three such points of intersection 
which we deem to be highly relevant (of course, we do not claim to be exhaustive).
14.3.2  Defining Ethical Leadership
We will structure the elements of ethical leadership using two categories which 
Treviño and colleagues (2000) termed the aspect of the “moral person” and the 
“moral manager.” According to these authors, moral person refers to traits, charac-
teristics and motivations of leaders. Yet, as Treviño et al. have emphasized, ethical 
leaders are not just moral persons, they are also moral managers in that they “lead” 
and influence followers to develop ethical conduct. This dimension of moral man-
ager represents the leader’s efforts to influence the ethical or unethical behaviors of 
followers. In what follows we focus on psychological literature but of course similar 
definitions are presented by business ethicists in philosophy (cf., Bowie 1999; Price 
2005; Solomon 2009). With regard to aspects of the ethical person, we deem the 
following facets to be fundamental.
Committed to ethical values: Psychologists usually assert that values, typically 
defined as stable beliefs about desirable states or conducts of behaviors (Schwartz 
1992), are standards that serve to judge and justify actions and have the potential to 
energize and regulate behavior (e.g. Verplanken and Holland 2002). Since standards 
and values guide choices and behaviors, ethical values appear to be at the root of 
ethical leadership (Lord and Brown 2001). Schmidt and Posner (1982) therefore 
asserted that managerial values are the “silent power” in personal and organiza-
tional life. Lennick and Kiel (2005) have emphasized that ethical leaders distinguish 
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themselves from other leaders in that their thoughts, decisions and actions appear to 
be guided by moral principles and values. Lennick and Kiel (2005) have used the 
metaphor of the “moral compass” to refer to this set of moral standards, values and 
beliefs which serve as a reference in all matters of right and wrong. Although having 
a moral compass is relevant, it is not sufficient to initiate action. A leader may some-
times have quite clear ideas about what should be done, but he or she may then lack 
the motivation to pursue it. Literature suggests that commitment to ethical values is 
such a crucial motivational source that it leads individuals to prioritize moral goals 
over other ones and to strive for desirable moral ends (Narvaez 2005; Rest 1986; 
Chap. 7 by Tanner and Christen, in this volume).
Given these findings, ethical leaders are expected to be committed to ethical 
values that serve to guide their thinking, decisions and actions. We believe that this 
aspect is the first intersection at which normative reflection should occur. More 
specifically, asserting that ethical values play a crucial role leads to the ultimate 
question: which values can we consider essential? Which moral principles should 
leaders convey? These are normative questions that cannot sufficiently be resolved 
on an empirical basis by common sense and consensual beliefs about what people 
consider to be relevant. We will discuss this topic more thoroughly in Sect. 14.4.
Endowed with ethical competencies: Here, we refer to an additional set of personal 
moral competencies that are likely to facilitate ethical leadership. First, we expect 
leaders to be ethically sensitive, recognizing and identifying ethical issues when they 
arise in practice. Individuals may not always be aware that they are facing an ethical 
issue. As Trevino & Brown accurately pictured, decisions rarely arrive with waving 
red flags announcing that they are ethical issues (2004: 70). The relevance of this 
point is obvious: if leaders do not recognize the ethical nature of a problem, no moral 
judgment or decision-making process is initiated (Narvaez 2005; Rest 1986; Bleisch 
and Huppenbauer 2011; Chap. 7 by Tanner and Christen, in this volume). We there-
fore consider ethical sensitivity to be another key feature of ethical leadership.
Second, ethical leaders need problem-solving capabilities. Once an ethical prob-
lem has been identified, the next challenge consists of finding viable ways to cope 
with it. Drawing on prior work and current research, effective problem-solving 
entails reasoning skills. From a moral philosophical perspective, reasoning demands 
the capability to critically and impartially reflect on ethical dilemmas and to give 
good reasons and proper justifications for possible solutions (Maak and Ulrich 
2007: 383ff, 480ff.). Leaders are frequently required to justify their decisions not 
only within the organization, but also towards stakeholders and society at large (e.g. 
Freemann et al. 2010). While moral psychology has intensively studied the develop-
ment from childhood to adulthood of moral reasoning processes since Kohlberg 
(1984) and the ways in which individuals think about ethical dilemmas and justify 
their decisions, normative ethics teaches the application of multiple frameworks as 
method of choice when faced with dilemmas where values conflict. Yet, as noted, 
ethical problems are often rather complex and confront individuals with great 
uncertainty regarding possible alternatives and consequences, competing values and 
incompatible courses of actions, pressures from outside. Individuals have to cope 
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with emotional stress, especially when strong beliefs or convictions are at risk or 
when decisions have threatening implications (e.g., employees may be harmed) 
(Hanselmann and Tanner 2008; Luce et al. 1997). In addition, ethical problems 
rarely offer obvious solutions concerning which course of action is most ethical. 
This requires sound and viable reasoning skills.
We suggest that this type of discernment is another key area where an exchange 
between empirical and normative viewpoints is useful. Acknowledging the com-
plexity of ethical decision-making is a critical step with respect to how a leader 
endowed with reflective capabilities should proceed in order to come up with a 
reasonable and justifiable solution. What are the criteria for appropriate and effec-
tive ethical decision-making and a reasonable solution? Again, we will address 
these questions later, in Sect. 14.4.
Note that reasoning and reflection typically require conscious cognitive or delib-
erate processing efforts. What if leaders work under conditions that limit their 
capacity for controlled processes, such as time pressure or high mental workload? 
Empirical evidence has demonstrated that under such conditions, which limit the 
capacity for extended reflection, individuals tend to rely on intuitive judgments 
(e.g., Fazio 1990; Marquardt and Hoeger 2009). Moral psychology and moral the-
ory, mainly in the Kantian tradition, have focused on the conscious and deliberate 
aspects of moral judgment (e.g., Kohlberg 1984). This research, however, has 
underestimated the role of intuitive and affective processes in (moral) decision- 
making—a critique that was, among others, highlighted by Roberts (2003) and 
Nichols (2004), as well as by the social intuitionist model of Haidt (2001). According 
to Haidt, people often base their moral judgments on quick flashes of affectively- 
laden approvals or disapprovals (“gut feelings”) which tell us that something is right 
or wrong (Haidt 2001; Monin et al. 2007). Meanwhile, an impressive body of 
research points to the fact that automatic and affective processes assert a much more 
powerful influence on judgment and decision-making than was previously believed 
(for an overview, see Loewenstein and Lerner 2003).
It seems obvious that, when under conditions that encourage intuitive rather than 
deliberate reasoning judgments, ethical leaders are expected to come up with the 
proper intuitions. Yet, when acknowledging that intuitions often play an essential 
and demonstrably causal role in decision-making, important questions arise as to 
how intuitive and reflective capabilities are or should be related. Is it acceptable, 
even desirable, to allow intuitions to affect ethical decisions or not? Are there 
“good” or “wrong” intuitions? What are the features of proper moral intuitions? The 
answer is not simple. There is a large body of psychological research demonstrating 
that intuitions and choices can easily be influenced by subtle, but otherwise irrele-
vant factors such as mood, problem descriptions, or the presence of others 
(Loewenstein and Lerner 2003). This provides little confidence about the relevance 
of intuitions. Other research, in contrast, supports the view that intuitions and affect 
contribute to better decision-making because they provide vital information about 
aspects of the current situation or about past experiences (Damasio 1994: Baumeister 
et al. 2007). This is another point of intersection for a dialog between empirical and 
normative approaches (see Sect. 14.4).
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Third, we expect ethical leaders to act upon moral values, consistently and per-
sistently, regardless of the presence of external obstacles. Ciulla (1999: 169) pointed 
out that “leaders sometimes lack the ability or the moral courage to act on their 
values”. But, leaders’ values only matter to organizations and followers if they con-
vey their values and beliefs through “visible” actions. Ethical leaders are therefore 
expected to act in accordance with ethical standards. Even more, we wish them to 
behave so on a regular basis. Fundamental to our conception is that consistency 
between words and deeds must be demonstrated repeatedly, across time and situa-
tions (Tanner et al. 2010). This is based on the idea that the more a leader maintains 
an ethical stance over time and situations, and the more predictable and transparent 
his or her behavior, the more likely observers will be to characterize the leader as 
credible, trustworthy, or possessing integrity (Tanner et al. 2010).
Whether or not leaders act on their values is also influenced by their moral cour-
age, the state of mind that enables one to pursue what is considered right, despite 
potentially unpleasant consequences (e.g., threat to career survival, financial costs, 
social pressures; Sekerka and Bagozzi 2007). We believe that ethical leaders are 
more likely than others to display moral courage and take a stand, even when it is 
costly (see also Solomon 2003).
We now turn to the aspect of ethical managers, which focuses on efforts to influ-
ence the ethical conduct of followers (Treviño et al. 2007). In general, there are 
several ways leaders can affect the ethical behavior of workers, including commu-
nication practices, performance compensation practices, ethical training, or codes 
of ethics, etc. (e.g. James 2000). We focus here primarily on two mechanisms that 
have been revealed to be important: role modeling and reinforcement by rewards 
and punishments.
Being a role model: Brown and colleagues (Brown et al. 2005; Brown and Treviño 
2006) emphasized that ethical leaders should promote normatively appropriate con-
duct via communication of clear standards and intentional role modeling. According 
to social learning theory (Bandura 1986), leaders influence the behavior of follow-
ers through modeling. Bandura demonstrated the relevance of vicarious learning, 
suggesting that individuals do not only learn through their own, direct practice, but 
also by observing others’ behavior and its consequences. The specific mechanisms 
involved are observation, imitation and identification. That is, by observing ethical 
leaders, followers may come to identify with those models, internalize their values 
and standards, and imitate their behaviors (Brown and Treviño 2006). Thus, having 
ethical leaders as role models can promote ethical conduct. Obviously, a leader’s 
capacity to be an ethical role model is also based on that leader’s ability to act upon 
ethical values, as noted above. We propose that only by engaging habitually in ethi-
cal behavior can leaders come to be seen as ethically credible models by the work-
ers. We conclude that ethical leadership also entails leaders becoming models of 
ethical conduct by engaging in ethical behaviors (Brown et al. 2005).
Reinforcing ethical conduct: In order to generally promote ethical conduct, it is 
essential for each organization to have a kind of feedback system that reinforces the 
achievement of ethical goals. There is an extensive theoretical and empirical 
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literature indicating that organizational (formal or informal) rewards and punish-
ments affect ethical behavior (see e.g., James 2000; Metzger et al. 1993). Above, we 
have highlighted the potential of vicarious learning. Followers also learn and adapt 
their behaviors through direct experience and its benefits and costs. Undoubtedly, 
due to their status and power to influence the organization and outcomes of others, 
leaders are an important source of reinforcement. Ethical leaders are therefore 
expected to set ethical expectations for followers and to hold them accountable by 
giving direct feedback on employees’ conduct. In essence, ethical leaders should 
ensure that unethical behavior is punished, while ethical behavior is rewarded 
(Ciulla 1998; Treviño et al. 2003). The organizational structure established by lead-
ers combined with informal organizational factors such as the corporate culture, are 
key elements in promoting ethical conduct (James 2000).
However, implementing a useful and effective reinforcement system is not sim-
ple. Some ethical lapses may go undetected, and others may not be the result of 
willful intent. In order to apply rewards and punishments, a leader must monitor and 
control follower’s behavior. However, prior research suggests that too much control 
can undermine followers’ work motivation or, when perceived as a threat to free-
dom, augment their resistance (i.e., reactance; Brehm 1966). Thus, it is not simple 
to ensure an “ethically balanced” system (James 2000) that does not inadvertently 
discourage ethical conduct.
To summarize, drawing on prior literature and building on our own work, we 
conceptualize ethical leadership as entailing: (a) adherence to ethically upright val-
ues and (b) endowment with ethical competencies. The latter entails subcompe-
tences, such as ethical sensitivity, ethical problem solving skills (including proper 
reflection and intuition), and the ability to act in accordance with ethical values 
across time and various settings. Furthermore, ethical leaders should have the abil-
ity to influence and encourage employees to behave ethically (Ciulla 2006). For this 
reason, they should (c) serve as role models for employees and d) use rewards and 
punishments to promote ethical conduct.
14.4  Interdisciplinary Research into Ethical Leadership: 
Intersections with Normative Reflection
In Sect. 14.3 we identified a select number of key areas and questions where an 
integration of psychology and normative ethics appears to be important to improve 
our understanding of ethical leadership. We focused on three sets of questions:
 1. Which values can we consider as essential in the context of ethical leadership? 
Which moral principles should leaders convey?
 2. What are the essential features of ethical decision-making and reasonable 
solutions?
 3. Is it acceptable or even desirable to allow intuitions to affect ethical decisions or 
not? Are there “good” or “wrong” intuitions?
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14.4.1  Which Moral Values and Norms May Be Essential  
for Ethical Leaders?
There is no doubt that ethical norms and values play a crucial role in economic and 
management contexts. But ethical leaders need to know which moral norms and 
values are considered as essential. This question has become increasingly signifi-
cant with the advance of globalization. Three points should be addressed here.
First: Throughout the world, a large number of countries has signed the “Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.” This indicates that the respect for human rights is 
nearing a consensus in the international community. Companies and ethical leaders 
can therefore draw on this global moral framework to adopt important values and 
standards. Even though the claim that human rights are grounded in universal moral 
principles has provoked highly controversial and lengthy philosophical and theo-
logical debates (cf., Dunfee and Donaldson 2002; Beauchamp 2010), it is reason-
able that companies and leaders apply this moral framework to their own values, 
goals and actions when faced with tangible ethical problems. Indeed, the “Universal 
Declaration of Human rights” and its subsequent covenants represent the greatest 
normative consensus achieved on this topic within the international community. In 
light of this level of agreement, any respectable company must ensure that its legiti-
mate pursuit of profits does not lead to ‘collateral damage’ in terms of human rights 
(Leisinger 2006: 15).
Furthermore, beyond the official consensus on human rights, a multitude of uni-
versally recognized norms, values and virtues exists for ethical leadership (e.g., 
Ciulla 2003; Price 2008; Solomon 2009). They include integrity, responsibility, 
compassion and forgiveness, as well as respect, honesty, integrity, caring, encour-
agement, courage and fairness, to name just a few. Norms, values and virtues of this 
nature have been well researched, both empirically and interculturally (see an over-
view, see Resick et al. 2006).
The problem is not so much a lack of awareness of these norms, values and vir-
tues, but the fact that they are usually formulated so generally that they fail to pro-
vide orientation for specific actions. Questions often arise regarding how they are to 
be interpreted and implemented in individual contexts. For this reason, Beauchamp 
(2010) states how important it is “that we engage in specification: the process of 
reducing the indeterminate character of abstract norms and generating more specific 
action-guiding content. All general norms must be specified for particular contexts” 
(Beauchamp 2010: 260). This is true, not only for moral protagonists making ethi-
cal decisions and engaging in ethical reflection, but also for empiricists conducting 
research in this field. Empirical studies are bound to an analogous specification 
process if their conclusions are to be of any use, when they operationalize norms, 
values or virtues (e.g., Tanner et al. 2010: 229). For example, the value “respect” is 
operationalized by Tanner et al. (2010) in the context of the following two behaviors 
by leaders: “Insults coworkers while others are present” or “Includes employees in 
decisions that affect them.” It is important to find appropriate specifications and 
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interpretations if research is to be fruitful, and this task is one that can only gain 
from an intersection between psychology and ethics.
These interpretations and specifications can, of course, lead to divergences and 
tensions, especially against a background of culturally differing interpretation pat-
terns. It is therefore important to know precisely the contextual circumstances of a 
moral debate when striving for good ethical decision-making (cf., Bleisch and 
Huppenbauer 2011: 18–31). Since, in addition, it is likely that individual prejudices, 
bias or group interests may have entered into the abovementioned processes of 
interpretation and specification (cf., Rawls 2005: 58), critical reflection is a must.
Second: Another problem exists in the issue of which moral theory should 
underlie ethical decision-making. Moral theories (e.g., deontology, consequential-
ism, ethics of virtue or contractualism) serve to evaluate and substantiate the ethi-
cal legitimacy of actions, norms and values (Audi 2010). They provide fundamental 
normative criteria. Depending on which theory is adopted, different judgments and 
decisions can result. Various authors advocate pragmatic and pluralistic dealings 
with moral theories (e.g., Goodpaster 2002; Crane and Matten 2010; Miner and 
Petocz 2003). Instead, they prefer not to rely on one theory alone but on different 
theories. An important basis for this position is everyday moral life. Often decision 
makers use consequentialist as well as deontological reasoning to arrive at ethical 
judgments (cf., Sparks and Pan 2010: 413). In line with this, Goodpaster (2002) 
employs four principal “normative lenses” (or “avenues”). With them, he system-
atically questions the interests, rights, obligations and virtues of all those involved 
and affected (Goodpaster 2002: 127ff.). The “normative lenses” he uses correspond 
to fundamental normative criteria representing important voices in the ethical 
debate. In a modified guise they take up the abovementioned moral theories, aim-
ing to achieve an adequate and potentially complex “insight of the moral point of 
view.”
Third: So-called “bottom-up” approaches are being used more and more in 
applied ethics instead of the classic “top-down” approaches. Rather than taking 
abstract moral theories as a starting point, opting for one theory and then applying 
that theory to real situations, moral principles are instead critically reconstructed on 
the basis of different areas of practice and moral experiences, as well as intuitions, 
and then used within the framework of ethical decision-making. Particularly in this 
context, then, it makes sense to speak of “empirically informed ethics” (cf., 
Musschenga 2005). In the classic work on this methodology (Beauchamp and 
Childress 1979), autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice are cited as 
four universally recognized and therefore consensual mid-range principles. 
Regarding the normative criteria used, this ethical approach is therefore pluralistic. 
An analogous pluralism can be found in more recent works aiming to provide 
decidedly practical and viable methods for ethical decision-making (cf., Mepham 
2008; Weston 2008; Bleisch and Huppenbauer 2011). Pluralism does not mean that 
the moral norms and values relevant to ethical leaders (such as fairness, respect, 
honesty, integrity) are arbitrary. Pluralism means that their justification and applica-
tion to specific situations can occur within the framework of different moral 
theories.
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14.4.2  What Are Essential Features of Ethical Decisions  
and Reasonable Solutions?
From a normative perspective, ethical competence undoubtedly includes certain 
reflective skills (Maak and Ulrich 2007: 383ff., 480ff.). From a certain distance and 
with a certain neutrality, ethical leaders have to be able to recognize moral issues, 
then to analyze and incorporate them in a reasonable decision (Bleisch and 
Huppenbauer 2011; Chap. 7 by Tanner and Christen, in this volume). In addition, 
ethical leaders are expected to justify their decisions, with sound arguments within 
their own company and in discussion with external stakeholders. What “reasonable” 
solutions are, how such arguments and justifications are to be structured, and how 
decisions are to be reached, all constitute crucial questions. Three points of interest 
with regard to this situation will be addressed in the following section.
First: As far as the meaning of “reasonable” is concerned, we find ourselves 
entering the terrain of moral philosophy. Taking all the information relevant to a 
problem (empirical facts, the interests of stakeholders, legal contexts, etc.) as a 
basis, it is sufficient for tangible problems to demand that controversial issues are 
processed in a manner that is intersubjectively comprehensible. This does not mean 
that a consensus must emerge. It simply means that reasonable persons have to be 
able to comprehend the decisions reached. In a famous formulation by John Rawls, 
reasonable persons are those who are able to “draw inferences, weigh evidence, and 
balance competing considerations” (Rawls 2005: 55). Since the use of such logical 
and argumentative means does not incorporate mathematically precise procedures 
and rules, differences of opinion are inevitable, as Rawls himself makes clear. 
However, it appears to be important with regard to moral practice that the interests 
and concerns of those affected and involved are fairly taken into account during the 
decision-making process (Dunfee and Donaldson 2009).
Second: Ethical leaders need to know how to arrive at well-structured and com-
prehensible results. Goodpaster (2002), for example, suggests a five-step method to 
cope with moral problems: (1) Describe the key factual elements of the situation; 
(2) Discern the most significant ethical issues at stake; (3) Display the main options 
available to the decision; (4) Decide among the options and offer a plan of action; 
(5) Defend your decision and your moral framework (Goodpaster 2002:128; see 
also Bleisch and Huppenbauer 2011 with an analogous model). Other authors have 
presented different methods of ethical decision-making (cf., Miner and Petocz 
2003; Payne 2006; Maak and Ulrich 2007). Which of these methods is used is of 
less importance than the fact that ethical decision-making proceeds in a well- 
structured way.
Third: As stated earlier, when discussing the leader’s problem-solving capabili-
ties (Sect. 14.3.2), leaders often rely on intuitive judgments to address commonly 
recurring situations because a lack of time and resources inhibits them from care-
fully applying methods of ethical decision-making. Nonetheless, from an ethical 
point of view, a retrospective critical analysis of intuition-guided behavior is recom-
mended to assess its adequacy. But even when sufficient time is available, it is 
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important to acknowledge that methods of ethical decision-making do rarely pro-
duce unambiguous and reproducible results (Palazzo 2007). Ethical decision- 
making is thus a process that must be continually reassessed.
14.4.3  What Relation Exists Between Moral Intuitions  
and Ethical Reflection?
This question brings us back to the abovementioned difference between empirical 
research and philosophical-normative reflection. On the one hand, empirical 
research can study how moral intuitions and reflection are interrelated in real ethical 
decision-making situations. On the other hand, philosophical reflection can (possi-
bly based on these empirical findings) establish norms for how ethical decision- 
making should take place.
As mentioned in Sect. 14.2, psychological research has promoted acknowledg-
ment of the role of moral intuitions and automatic processes in ethical decision- 
making (Kennett and Fine 2009; Treviño 2009). Meanwhile, a number of 
philosophical (and theological) authors have also advocated metaethical and meth-
odological positions, according to which moral intuitions are an important compo-
nent of ethical decision-making. In fact, the problem is not the moral intuitions 
themselves, but the question of the nature of the role they should play in processes 
of ethical decision-making. Looking at van Thiel and van Delden (2010: 189; see 
also their Chap. 10 in this book), one can first define moral intuitions very generally 
as “beliefs that a person comes to hold without extensive deliberation.” On this 
foundation they then present an interesting model for how, within a theory of 
“Reflective Equilibrium,” empirical findings can be used during decision-making: 
“The thinker who wants to produce a reflective-equilibrium has to consider empiri-
cal elements together with normative principles and background theories. In this 
process, the thinker aims for coherence among all relevant considerations” (van 
Thiel and van Delden 2010: 193). Empirical elements refer to the moral intuitions 
of practitioners who have gained a wealth of experience in their specific contexts: 
“People who work and live in a certain moral practice have experiences that are 
generally not found among those outside this practice” (Van Thiel and van Delden 
2010: 187). Seen from this perspective, this model also makes it clear that moral 
intuitions are not simply emotions and affects which occur randomly and then dis-
appear again, like anger, annoyance or rage: “These experiences amount to specific 
moral wisdom, which can be defined as expert-level knowledge and judgment in the 
fundamental pragmatics of life” (Van Thiel and van Delden 2010: 187).
Due to its focus on acquired competencies, this definition of moral wisdom can 
readily be linked to approaches from an ethics of virtues (Solomon 1992, 2003, 
2009), yet is also in line with psychological approaches. According to several 
authors, intuitive decisions are highly accurate when they are “expert-like” (Dane 
and Pratt 2007; Hogarth 2001). As Narvaez and other scholars posited, moral 
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experts are similar to other experts. They differ from novices in that they have more 
complex, domain-relevant and chronically accessible mental structures, which trig-
ger effective responses (Dane and Pratt 2007; Narvaez 2005; Lapsley and Narvaez 
2005).
Van Thiel and van Delden (2010) argue that no intuitions need advance discard-
ing from the ethical decision-making process. This stems from their definition of 
intuitions as expert knowledge. As the result of experiences, these intuitions do of 
course contain manifold influences, as well as reflections about the experiences in 
question (cf., Musschenga 2009: 608). Since they wish to have a basis for ethical 
decision-making that is as broad as possible, and an ethical judgment that is sup-
ported as broadly as possible, they rely on as much expert knowledge as possible 
(Van Thiel and van Delden 2010: 198f.). From an ethical perspective, this does not 
mean, however, that all the intuitions brought into play by experts are inherently 
correct. As already mentioned, prior research has revealed that intuitive judgment 
choices can easily be influenced by subtle but otherwise irrelevant factors such as 
mood, problem descriptions, presence of others (Loewenstein and Lerner 2003). 
Furthermore, it is probable that specific prejudices, biases and group interests may 
have entered into moral intuitions (see also Musschenga 2009). The important task 
of reflection and critical deliberation is thus to adopt a critical stance towards moral 
intuitions: “In the … process of moral reasoning, moral intuitions, principles and 
theories can gain or lose justificatory power” (Van Thiel and van Delden 2010: 198). 
In short, it is not self-evident that every expert intuition is ethically justified. This 
can only be judged as the result of an empirically enriched deliberation process.
Despite empirical research having demonstrated that human beings do not regu-
larly draw on critical analysis and reflection, this does not imply that reflection is 
not needed; quite the contrary! Leaders should use reflective competencies at least 
in difficult and controversial situations. Lack of time is not a sound argument in 
most instances. Since moral questions usually address important issues, they should 
be processed with the same degree of earnestness and expertise as other important 
business issues. We do not intend to imply that protagonists have to be in a constant 
state of reflection but there are certainly many situations where intuition-based 
decision- making is clearly appropriate. Key occasions for reflection arise when con-
flicting interests are held by company stakeholders and intuitions are not helping to 
resolve the turmoil.
Since stakeholders are likely to have divergent interests and moral intuitions, not 
only the moral intuitions of the leaders themselves should be integrated in the pro-
cess of ethical decision-making, but also those of the relevant stakeholders. 
Unfortunately, intuitions and convictions held by different stakeholders are some-
times directly and irreconcilably opposed (Leisinger 2006: 19). To deal with such 
situations, obviously, recourse to intuitions is not enough. Reasoned communica-
tion is needed between those involved, and in order for this to succeed, reflective 
and critical competences are required: “Reasoning skills may not be necessary for 
finding the right answers to moral problems, but you cannot participate in collective 
debates without having them” (Musschenga 2009: 609).
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In conclusion, this chapter was designed to highlight some typical features of the 
empirical and normative approaches toward exploring ethical leadership and ethical 
decision-making. Based on a respect for the unique disciplinary foci, while remain-
ing critical, we tried to sketch out some areas of intersections where ethics and 
psychology can learn and benefit from each other. Of course, more work and ongo-
ing dialog are needed to develop further forms of integration. We believe, however, 
that attempts at interdisciplinary collaboration in the development of business ethics 
are, in the long term, beneficial for researchers and practitioners alike.
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